Machan's Little Libertarian Encyclopedia
Chapter 8: Equality
The US Declaration of Independence tells us that the founders took it to be self-evident that "all men are created equal." Ever since critics of the idea of the free society have complained that this is nonsense because, in fact, we are quite evidently not all created equal. Indeed, they stress, the truth is we ought to be equal — it is only fair and just. So the role of force in society is not mainly to repel criminal conduct but to make us all equal in all important respects. The kind of equality critics of the American political tradition want is, for starters, impossible. In trying for it one immediately destroys any hope for it, since the enforcers will always be unequal to those at whom their force is targeted.
The only equality worthy of concern, because it is both possible and just, is the kind the Declaration mentions. We are supposed to have been created equal in the respect of possessing the unalienable rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. In other words, we are all rights possessors (except some rare, crucially incapacitated people). That doesn't mean we are equal in our height, fortune, intelligence, looks or talents. Nor, especially, are we all equally well off or even ought to be.
The point of the Declaration's limited egalitarianism is to stress that a distinctive element of human social life is that despite all clear and undeniable differences among human beings, there are some basic principles we ought to respect and protect, namely, our fundamental rights as agents of our choices, ones that in society require this respect and protection. Moreover, when governments are instituted among us, the protection of individual rights is due to each member of society.
Any kind of broader egalitarianism is impossible. That is not, however, how many famous thinkers would have it. Consider the late Isaiah Berlin, who said that "The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so....If I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one tenth to reach, this will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification: whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason."
Yet the case does not prove anything about equality, only about what is expected of one who sets out to divide things among a group, such as what parents do among their children, coaches among team mates, teachers among members of their class and so on. This is because, first of all, a duty exists to care for, train, and teach (respectively) the members of the group in question, not because the axiomatic value of equality as such. If, in contrast, one gives Christmas gifts differentially, depending, say, on how close one is to the recipient, such giving requires no justification at all, it's taken for granted. Even as one distributes candy on Halloween night, doing it unequally requires no justification; it depends on the age and other apparent attributes of the kids who come to one's door.
Experiences confirm these counter-examples everywhere. Evading them just leads toward undermining that one kind of equality among human beings that is possible and politically right, namely, the equal respect and protection of our rights, one that rests on the prior importance of fulfilling promises or compacts made between the people and their governments!
In any case, throughout nature, including human social life, ranking is unavoidable. No matter how much one might wish for it, there will always be better and worse cases of human conduct, institutions, products, and so forth. Not even those who preach full egalitarianism can stick to their "principles."
As an example, consider that famous liberal institution, National Public Radio and its various programs. (In England the BBC would serve as a case in point.) The sheer limitation of time faced in all programming requires selectivity and the elitism NPR practices belies its bleeding heart egalitarianism. The same is true of academic moral philosophy, which is dominated by egalitarian sentiments and ideas. Yet, in practice, academic moral philosophers are very picky about whom they will admit into their ranks. Such academic stars as John Rawls and Peter Singer are all housed in very highly ranked institutions, despite all their self-proclaimed egalitarianism. And if it were not they, it would be some others. It is impossible to adhere to egalitarianism, period.
We can look elsewhere for even better confirmation of the impossibility of the sort of egalitarianism championed by socialists and welfare statists. Consider how even non-commercial organizations select artists on the basis of some standard — my local non-commercial jazz and blues station constantly features favorites and lists the more renowned artists who take part in various public performances. The symphony in the region must select orchestras and compositions that will be featured. Museums have only so much space available to devote to featured artists. Scholarly journals cannot publish all papers submitted to them. Star systems abound everywhere. So what is available to us is not the kind of impossible egalitarianism socialists and other sentimentalists preach. Rather what we can aspire to is to rank on the basis of valid standards, ones that are difficult to identify but nonetheless our responsibility to discover and apply.
The rest of nature is differentiated mainly by reference to power or fitness for physical survival. Where human beings are different is not in being fit to be cut down to an equal status (on all vital fronts) but in the capacity to make as sure as possible that when they rank, they do it justly, based on merit, desert, competence, achievement and such and that in any case none have their basic rights violated.